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Within the attempts to understand Mexican economic inequality, returns to education have received a great 
deal of attention. The driving question has been: why are Mexican wages so unequal? This paper argues 
that not only the distribution of human capital matters, but also sociodemographic variables, which have 
their own dynamics and complex interactions with the former. A three-equation maximum likelihood 
specification in which employment, hours worked and log-wages, as well as their joint variance matrix is 
proposed, generalizing the Mincerian specification. The resulting is a complex story, where income profiles 
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I. Introduction 
Within the attempts to understand Mexican economic inequality, returns to education 
have received a great deal of attention. The driving question has been: why are Mexican 
wages so unequal? Is it that the distribution of human capital is very unequal itself, that 
there is an increasing difference within superior levels of education, or both effects 
appear combined
1 (Lopez-Acevedo 2004, Meza 1999) ? Moreover, and quite important 
from a policy perspective: how have the returns to education changed under the time 
framework?  The 90’s in Mexico is a period of special interest for the understanding of 
returns to education (and inequality) because two mayor events occurred. First, signing of 
commercial treaties and a dramatic increase in trade (e.g. NAFTA). Second, the worst 
economic crisis in the modern history of the country happened in 1995. A recent paper 
that tries to understand inequality given these phenomena is Esquivel and Rodriguez-
Lopez (2003). 
This paper proposes that in order to understand the dynamics of inequality via 
returns to education, the analysis should not be restricted to the evolution of the 
educational distribution. There are factors within the workforce population that may be of 
considerable importance in explaining them. Among these factors different age 
structures, gender composition, unionization, regional development levels, are 
instrumental to recognize how returns to education have evolved. In Mexican experience 
the analysis of these variables has been limited. This should not come as a surprise given 
that the model employed most of the times to deal with these effects, the Mincerian 
equation, is quite limited itself (Card 2003). 
In this paper we seek a more structural explanation of the returns to education in 
Mexico, employing a variation of the model first presented in (Mehta and Villarreal 
2004). We propose and estimate a three-equation maximum likelihood specification in 
which employment, hours worked and log-wages, as well as their joint variance matrix, 
are conditioned on a generalized Mincerian specification. The resulting is a complex 
story, where the educational levels interact with a set of variables to generate particular 
                                                 
1 Of course other reasons are pertinent: a quality component within human capital (i.e. different schools’ 
qualities), social networks, etc. However given the availability of data, the two effects mentioned have 
received most of the attention.   3
income profiles. If inequality is to be explained via returns to education, these variables 
need to be considered. 
The structure of the paper is the following: Section II presents a description of the 
empirical environment. Data, variables constructed, a succinct descriptive analysis and 
some conjectures are included in the section. In Section III the need of a statistical model 
is motivated, while the model and the function to estimate it are developed in appendices 
at the end of this study. Econometric results are discussed in this section and simulations 
of the evolution of income for a specific profile are presented. Section IV links the 
statistical results with policy implications. Issues regarding development and welfare are 
considered. Finally, Section V briefly concludes. 
 
II. The empirics 
The Mexican education system is a mixture of public and private institutions. The public 
institutions depend on federal, state or municipal governments for funding.  Even though 
many children attend kindergarten, it is not an official prerequisite for admission to most 
primary schools.
2  Usually, twelve years of formal education are completed prior to 
college: six of primary school, three of junior-high and three of high school.  College 
typically takes five years to complete, although the duration does vary. 
The data source for this study are the ENIGHs (Encuestas Nacionales de Ingreso y 
Gasto de los Hogares), which are household income-expenditure surveys, collected by 
INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica) in 1992, 1994, 1996, 
1998, 2000 and 2002. Our dataset has three strengths.  The first is that besides school 
attainment and income variables, a rich set of sociodemographic characteristics is 
included in the surveys.  Second, it contains data on the successful completion of school 
years and diplomas, rather than just temporal measures of schooling.  As Jaeger and Page 
(1996) point out, this is important because imputing completion from temporal data can 
bias results. Thirdly, the surveys have been collected with a consistent methodology, thus 
enabling intertemporal comparisons. 
                                                 
2 This may vary according to states or the kind of school.  Many private schools do require some 
preprimary education.   4
We pare down our sample using criteria that are standard in this literature, 
restricting our sample to non-students between the ages of 16 (the legal working age) and 
65.  We include employees and unemployed members of the work-force.
 3  Our sample of  
graduate degree recipients was too thin for computational purposes and we were forced to 
drop them. Table1 provides the means of most of the variables under consideration in this 
study.  
 
Description of Variables  
Income: refers to quarterly labor income in December 2002 Pesos. The Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) is employed to put (deflate) the monetary values in equivalent units. 
Hours: Is the average number of hours worked per week for the employees within a 
particular category (sector of the economy
4 or educational level). 
Sex Ratio: Is the average of the gender variable within each category. The Dummy 
variable takes one for male and zero for female, thus a value of 100% implies only males 
work in that category.  
Literate: If the worker is able to read and write. If a worker has an educational 
attainment of completed primary education, literacy is implied by default. 
Union: Is the average of the dummy variable that takes the value of one if the worker 
belongs to a union, and zero if not. 
Age: Average age of the workers within each category. 
S_Index: This variable is an index of the average labor income, it uses the year 1992 as 
base (i.e. 1992=1). 






                                                 
3 Smith and Metzger (1998) find, in a Mexican context, that failure to control for returns to capital biases 
estimates of returns to education upwards as educational attainment correlates positively with capital and 
earnings.  Hence, it is advisable, and standard, to discard observations of self-employed workers. 
4 If an employee works in two different sectors of the economy, his “principal job” is used for 
classification.   5
  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
General    
Income   12291 13601 9326 9890 11814 11671
Hours  44.79 45.24 45.18 45.88 45.62 46.65
sex ratio  71.34% 70.53% 68.72% 68.28% 67.92% 65.83%
Literate  94.30% 93.73% 94.49% 94.34% 95.75% 95.07%
Union  20.36% 16.01% 14.30% 14.70% 15.07% 15.13%
Age  32.13 32.43 32.60 33.22 33.95 34.97
S_index  1.00 1.11 0.76 0.80 0.96 0.95
Years  7.88 8.05 8.34 8.41 8.83 8.79
      
Primary      
Income labor  8737 8420 6322 6515 7930 7294
Hours  47.18 46.45 46.93 47.01 47.54 46.78
sex ratio  79.05% 77.34% 72.17% 70.63% 71.76% 68.14%
Union  15.47% 12.49% 12.21% 10.47% 9.01% 11.83%
Age  31.19 31.68 32.75 33.36 34.46 35.51
s_index  1.00 0.96 0.72 0.75 0.91 0.83
      
Secondary      
Income labor  10346 10299 7259 7651 8496  8787
Hours  44.64 44.51 45.13 46.32 46.96 48.28
sex ratio  65.88% 69.08% 71.41% 68.80% 71.69% 68.99%
Union  21.26% 15.63% 12.19% 14.91% 14.06% 13.05%
Age  26.77 27.32 27.63 28.10 29.32 30.55
s_index  1.00 1.00 0.70 0.74 0.82 0.85
      
High School      
Income labor  15549 16589 10997 12195 12714 13033
Hours  39.86 40.15 42.42 44.01 44.1 46.82
sex ratio  49.50% 45.69% 52.43% 54.00% 51.91% 54.69%
Union  34.64% 27.66% 22.27% 25.46% 23.40% 18.82%
Age  29.75 30.56 30.58 31.32 32.48 32.19
s_index  1.00 1.07 0.71 0.78 0.82 0.84
      
College      
Income labor  33528 43955 26434 27354 30210 28871
Hours  40.48 43.06 43.33 40.47 40.77 43.93
sex ratio  62.73% 64.43% 59.03% 59.93% 63.24% 60.74%
Union  37.44% 31.25% 29.10% 28.95% 33.07% 27.07%
Age  35.81 35.73 35.47 37.03 37.13 36.61
s_index  1.00 1.31 0.79 0.82 0.90 0.86


























Fig. 1 S_Index for the whole economy and for educational levels. 
 
Figure 1 provides a series of facts for analysis. The first observation is that salaries rose 
sharply from 1992 to 1994 for the general population. The change from 1992 to 1994 is 
different when the indices are constructed based on educational levels (completed).   In 
1994 the labor income of persons with primary education reduces compared to 1992, the 
labor income of persons with junior high remains close, the earnings of people with high 
school increase, and finally and quite interesting the earning of people with college 
overshoot, augmenting close to 30% in real terms. Not surprisingly, studies that that 
employ 1994 in their data may tend to find an increasing inequality due to education (i.e. 
Bouillon et. al). Among the explanations provided, a restructuring of the labor markets 
caused by NAFTA is often invoked. The rationale is that scarce human capital was 
receiving a premium (Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez). 
What makes the previous observation starker is that after the 1996 crisis, earnings 
collapsed in real terms in the general economy and for all the educational levels. The 
drastic reduction in salaries from 1994 to 1996 has been well documented (Lopez-
Acevedo 2004), and despite its magnitude makes sense: the economy had a very strong 
negative growth, unemployment soared, and prices skyrocketed. It is a well known fact 
that salaries, due to contracts and other reasons are much stickier compared to most   7
prices. Consequently they tend to lag with respect to the Consumer Price Index.
5   
According to Fig. 1, by year 2002 the general population’s average labor income had 
almost recovered with respect to 1992. The story is different for labor income for the 
different educational levels: they are at about 85% of those of year 1992. To understand 
how both facts can be reconciled, the answer may lay on Tables 1: the mean years of 
education for the general population had increased almost a year, plus people were 
working on average two more hours per week. Several implications stem from the latter, 
among which, is that on average people need more human capital and work more hours to 
obtain similar earnings to those of a decade before. Second, when considering that 
usually people in the workforce do not receive education, the higher averages imply that 
persons that are currently joining the workforce have much higher levels of education 
than their peers, otherwise the increase in average years for the whole sample will occur 
at a lower pace. 
Before presenting any sort of statistical analysis, two caveats should be discussed. 
The first one, and unfortunately quite common in the literature, is that given the lack of 
information regarding school quality, a quality component within the human capital, and 
its evolution cannot be used to explain the observed facts. 
The second one and less recognized, is the avoidance of jumping to welfare 
conclusions from either figures 1 or 2. The reason is that in this paper the CPI is used to 
deflate, in the presence of very high inflations (in the case of Mexico between 1992 and 
2002, it is more than 300%), the consumer price index performs poorly as a cost of living 
index (Banks et al. 1996, Ruiz-Castillo 1998, Villarreal 2004). Thus, an intertemporal 







                                                 
5 Notice that if the contract effect is true, people in the informal sector may have an advantage. If working 
in the informal sector is correlated with lower educational levels, and these with low incomes; a non 
intuitive result may be generated: poor people will be less affected by inflation.    8
III. A statistical framework 
If the ultimate goal is the understanding of inequality as related to returns to education, it 
should be realized that the evolution of returns to education is embedded within a 
complex dynamic of sociodemographic characteristics. Moreover, if the set of 
characteristics in the person profile that influences returns to education is big enough, an 
analysis of means (or differences-in-differences) will not suffice to control or explain the 
effects. Consequently an econometric analysis needs to be performed. 
  The workhorse for this kind of analysis is the Mincerian equation, it has nice 
properties, amongst which it is easy to estimate and interpret. Unfortunately in the 
presence of heterogeneity, the Mincerian equation tends to predict biased results. Given, 
the vast variations in the observed dynamics of sociodemographic characteristics for the 
data in this paper, we need a more structural explanation. We will employ a simplified 
version of the model presented in (Mehta and Villarreal 2004). 
  The model utilized in this study and the derivation of the maximum likelihood 
function used to estimate it, are presented in Appendix A and B respectively. For ease or 
reading the mathematics and technical details are relegated to the appendices, however 
the general intuition would be discussed here. 
  The first part of the job to be realized consists of the estimation of the model for 
each of the years. Afterwards the implied effects for each sociodemographic effect should 
be compared across time. In this way the role of sociodemographic characteristics in the 
income profiles can be identified and their role in inequality inferred. The principal 
effects will be discussed to some extent in this section. Notice, however that given the 
large amount of parameters, plus their different economic significance, to sum up the 
effects and interpret them can be difficult. In order to discuss the results in a more 
amicable way, the estimated parameters will be employed to simulate and generate a 
profile that is comparable over time.  Of course the patterns do not have to replicate 
across profiles, and important differences may exist, but the exercise can be done 
according to the specific group under study.   
 
 
   9
Results 
  92-94 94-96 96-98 98-00 00-02 
Union  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↓  ↑ 
Experience  ↑  ↓  ↑  ↓  ↓ 
Exp. Sq.  ↓  ↑  ↓  ↑  ↓ 
Rural  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓ 
Male  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↓  ↑ 
North  ↓  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↓ 
South  ↓  ↑  ↓  ↑  ↓ 
Primary  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↑  ↓ 
Secondary  ↑  ↑  ↓  ↓  ↑ 
HighSchool  ↑  ↑  ↓  ↑  ↓ 
College  ↑  ↓  ↑  ↓  ↑ 
Table 2. Evolution of sociodemographic profile effects on the income equation. An increasing effect (↑) 
means that the effect was greater that in the previous year, a decreasing effect (↓) means that the effect was 
smaller that in the previous year. 
 
In the case of North and South, both are dummies referring that the employee lives in that 
region of the country.
6 The school level effects refer to the effects of years within that 
level. It is interesting to notice that many of the sociodemographic effects have been 
increasing or decreasing through time, i.e. there is not a clear tendency. The exception is 
rural, meaning that ceteris paribus, the effect of living in rural areas is becoming more 
negative for expected income. One surprising result is the male effect that is the dummy 
variable of being a male. A decreasing effect was expected, however it is increasing (thus 
generating a bigger salary gap) for all the comparisons except one. 
  Experience and experience squared (the obsolesce factor) have not a clear tendency, 
instead they are flipping signs. This is important because during the next twenty years big 
cohorts of young workers will incorporate into the labor force. If experience looses 
importance and new workers come with higher levels of education a displacement effect 
may occur. 
 With  respect  to  unionization, as seen in Table 1 there has been some declining in 
the membership to union in the last ten years, however there positive effect on salaries 
seems to be increasing in almost all the studied period. To what extent this effect is 
localized within specific sectors (e.g. government) remains a task for further research. 
                                                 
6 Twelve states are defined in the North region: BC, BCS, Sin., Son., Chih., Coah., N.L., Tamps., Dgo., 
Qro., SLP, and Zac. Eight states form the South region:  Gro., Oax., Ver., Camp., Chis., Q.R., Tab. and 
Yuc.   10
  In the case of the parameters employed in this study, almost all of them were 
statistically significant in explaining the variation of earnings. However, this does not 
imply that they were economically significant (that is, there effects in earnings may be 
small), thus further analysis is needed before reaching conclusions. It should also be 
notice that in this paper, the attention has been put to the effects of parameters on 
earnings, however and given the nature of the model presented in the appendices, a 
similar analysis can be made for the propensity of being employed, or the amounts of 
hours worked. 
 
  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
0 6771 6629 4712 4918 4712 6574
1 7273 7146 5043 5257 5043 6858
2 7825 7722 5401 5624 5401 7168
3 8433 8367 5788 6021 5788 7505
4 9104 9088 6208 6451 6208 7872
5 9845 9897 6662 6917 6662 8272
6 11733 11420 7878 8451 7878  9740
7 12655 12915 8711 8950 8711 10426
8 13702 14671 9637 9502 9637 11178
9 15731 15354 10596 10984 10596 11772
10 17530 17982 11946 12183 11946 13381
11 19568 21148 13485 13524 13485 15264
12 23011 25033 16084 17290 16084 17728
13 26079 28565 18395 19973 18395 19652
14 29666 32632 21118 23126 21118 21825
15 33875 37321 24336 26840 24336 24286
16 38826 42732 28152 31223 28152 27075
17 44891 55060 32839 35795 32839 31985
Table 3 Simulations of earnings in December 2002 Pesos for a married male, from central Mexico, non-
unionized, living in an urban area, with 20 years of experience. 
 
  Given the complexity of the effects involved and the amount of parameters, it 
would be convenient to summarize he complete picture. In order to show how this can be 
done, some simulations were performed with the parameters estimated with the model of 
appendices A and B., they are presented in Table 3. A profile that was considered highly 
representative was chosen
7: male, married, from central Mexico, non-unionized, living in 
an urban area, with 20 years of experience. Figure 2 is a good auxiliary to interpret the 
                                                 
7 Notice the simulations can be performed for each posible sociodemogrpahic profile.   11
results of Table 3. It seems that for this profile the 1995 crisis had a more or less uniform 
impact with respect to the 1992 income/education distribution. The impact is not uniform 
when compared to 1994, because of the overshooting of returns to college years in the 
1992-1994 period. Notice that in 1998 are the returns to College years which are showing 
more improvement, but afterwards they plunged while the lower part of the educational 

















Fig 2.Results from Table 3. 
 
IV. Policy Implications 
The effects of additional human capital (i.e. years of education) seem to still have a 
strong and increasing effect on earnings. However, inequality may persist due to various 
reasons. First, while the bottom educational distribution have recovered labor income 
levels similar to those of 1992, the middle and upper part of the distribution are still 
lagging. This may not be the case for people with graduate school education, but given 
our sample we cannot measure it. 
  Second, there exist some specific subgroups that are (or may become vulnerable): 
people living in rural areas, some people in the south states, older cohorts, and possibly 
women.   12
  Third, if physical capital is a complement to human physical, it can be conjectured 
that Mexico may need more physical capital, and that investments of this type, will 
increase the returns to human capital.  
V. Conclusions 
This paper started with the purpose to explain in a better way the linkage between returns 
to education and inequality. It was argued that not only the distribution of human capital 
matters, but also sociodemographic dynamics that have their own dynamics and complex 
interactions with the former. 
  This study suggests that factors such as regional location, age (i.e. experience), 
gender, rural areas, etc., do play a very significant role in the determination of returns to 
education and thus inequality. However, the evolution of their effects and their 
interactions is complex.  This invites to perform simulations for more profiles, in order to 
obtain a detail picture of the educational/income profiles of the whole population. An 
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Appendix A: The Model. 
 
The Mincerian Equation  
  The most common Mincerian equation takes the following form: 
(A1)  ( ) ∑
=
+ + + + = =




sl E E D s E E w y
, , ,
2 2 0 ln δ δ δ δ δ ,  
where w is a person’s hourly earnings, sometimes referred to as their implicit wage.  E, 
potential experience, is the maximum length of time they could have been in the labor 
force given their age and education.  l indexes the level of education (primary, junior-
high, high-school and college).  sl measures the number of years of education level l 
completed, and is therefore bounded between zero and the number of school years 
required to complete that level.   Dl indicates whether the lth diploma was received.  The 
growth rate of wages with years of experience and of schooling at level l are E
E E 2 2δ δ +  
and 
sl δ  respectively.  Similarly,  ( ) 1 exp −
Dl δ  is the percentage wage increase associated   14
with receipt of diploma l over and above that conferred by completion of the final year of 
the degree.  Typically, 
0 δ  is permitted to vary with personal characteristics.  Notice that a 
specification that “corrects” for such personal characteristics through 
0 δ   still imposes 
constant returns to education and experience with respect to these characteristics. 
Our Model: 
  We are interested in the determinants of three variables: employment (z i = 0 or 1), 
hours worked if employed (hi) , and the logarithm of hourly earnings if employed (yi).  In 
order to investigate these, we specify the following structure based, in principle, on 
Heckman’s (1974) selection scheme.  Each person observed in the cross-section is 
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; 
 zi = 1 if 
*
i z ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise; 
  hi = 
*
i h  if 
*
i z ≥ 0 and is unreported otherwise; 
 y i = 
*
i y  if 
*
i z ≥ 0 and is undefined otherwise. 
Thus, 
*
i z  is latent employment propensity while 
*
i h  and 
*
i y  are the latent hours 
and logged earnings potentials – observable only if a worker is employed.   i Σ  is a 
positive definite variance matrix for person i.  i θ  and  i σ  are the standard deviations of the 
“unexplained” components of the hours and logged earnings potentials respectively.  
Each of the ρki is a correlation coefficient between unobservable components. 
The allowance for heteroskedasticity is implemented via the Cholesky 
decomposition such that: 
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where xji are worker characteristics that may condition the variance matrix.  From (A3) it 
follows that:   15




































2 5 1 4 3 4





4 3 1 1
'
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
i i
i i i i
a a a a a a a a
a a a a a a a
a a
A A V
σ σ θ ρ σ ρ
σ θ ρ θ θ ρ
σ ρ θ ρ
ε . 
Standard results regarding the log-normal distribution
8 imply the following 
expressions for the expectation and standard deviation of hourly earnings  ( ) ( )
* * exp i i y w =  
for person i: 
(A5)  ( ) 2 exp ) (
2 *
i yi i x w E σ δ + = , 
(A6)  () () ( )
2 2 * exp 2 exp exp ) .( . i i yi i x w D S σ σ δ − = . 
This means that in the presence of conditional heteroskedastity in logged earnings 
(i.e. α2, α4, α5, ≠ 0), a homoskedastic model is incapable of predicting not only the 
second, but also the first moment of the earnings distribution, underestimating the 
expected earnings for persons subject to above average wage variability.  It also means 
that tests on δ do not suffice to test hypotheses regarding average actual (not logged) 
wages in a heteroskedastic world. 
  Next, we delineate the content of the main equations and the Cholesky matrix.  Two 
criteria were used in selecting the conditioning variables.  First, would their inclusion 
allow us to estimate parameters crucial to our hypothesis tests?  Second, would their 
exclusion mingle returns to education for different types of people, resulting in erroneous 
acceptance of the null of no diploma effects? 
 Logged  wages,
*
i y , and employment propensity,
*
i z  are conditioned on exactly the 
components of the RHS of (2), except that a few intercept shifters are added.  Each 
equation is shifted by gender, region, and urban vs. rural location.  Union membership 
condition earnings, but not employment, as there are almost no unemployed union 
members.  Additionally 
*
i z  is shifted by marital status and the interaction of marital status 
and gender.  Hence we estimate the following conditional expectations functions: 
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In principle, we could have conditioned hours,
*
i h , on the same Mincerian variables as 
employment and logged wages.  However, as we do not have good reasons to propose the 
possibility of diploma effects in the hours equation, we include only four slopes - one for 
each level of schooling, experience and its square, and the same intercept shifters as are 
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hi Male Rural Union North South Couple
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Couple Male
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  It is clear from (4b) that the variables conditioning a1 and a2 will most strongly 
effect θ  and σ  respectively.  Similarly,  2 1,ρ ρ  and  3 ρ  can be conditioned through a3, a4 
and a5 respectively.  There are likely scenarios wherein an urban location and gender 
would condition all five elements of the variance matrix.  We therefore conditioned each 
Cholesky element on these two characteristics.   Similarly  3 2 1 , , ρ ρ ρ  and θ  are 
conditioned on the number of years of schooling.
9  Unionization was supposed to 
effectθ ,σ  and  3 ρ  for obvious reasons.  Finally, in keeping with the discussion of section 
II, σ  was conditioned on the same variables as
*
i y , through a2, in order to capture 




11 1 1 1 1
MRU S
i Male Rural Union a D D D Schooling αα α α α =+ + + +  
(A11)  () ( )
02 2
22 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2, 2,
,,
MRU E E
i Male Rural Union
sl Dl sc Dc
ll h P F c P F c
lp j h
aD D D E E
sD D s D
αα α α α α
αα α α
=
=+ + + + + +
++ + ∑
 
                                                 
9 The key to table 5 describes how the ‘schooling’ variable was constructed.   17






i 3 3 3
0
3 3 α α α α + + + =  






i 4 4 4
0
4 4 α α α α + + + =  
(A14) 
0
55 5 5 5 5
MRU S
i Male Rural Union a D D D Schooling αα α α α =+ + + + . 
 
Appendix B:  Derivation of the likelihood function. 
  The sample is divided between those members of the labor force who are  
employed (zi=1), and those who are not (zi=0).  Hence, if f( ) denotes the distribution of 
potential hours and log earnings conditional on employment, the log-likelihood function 
is of the form: 
(B1)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ∑ ∑
= =




1 , 1 Pr ln 0 Pr ln
i i z
i i i i
z
i z h y f z z LLF .   
We suppress i for notational purposes for the rest of the derivation.  Let Φ denote the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function.  As usual: 
(B2)  ()( ) ( ) ( ) z z x e x z z β β − Φ = ≤ + = ≤ = = 0 Pr 0 Pr 0 Pr
* .   
Further, the joint density of 
* *,h y  and z in braces in (B1) can be factored differently, and 
expressed in terms of the latent
* z , rather than z: 
(B3)  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ()
* * * * * * * * * * * , , 0 Pr , , 1 Pr 1 , 1 Pr h y g h y z h y g h y z z h y f z > = = = = = ,  
where g( ) is the joint density of 
*
i y  and 
*
i h  only.   
  Following Goldberger (1991), pp.196-97, our normality assumptions (B3) imply 
that ( ) () 11 1












































































3 2 1 *
2 1 1
 and 






22 ρ ρ − + + − = Σ C AC A ( ) 3 2 1 ρ ρ ρ − = A ; ( ) 3 1 2 ρ ρ ρ − = C . 
Thus,  





* * * , 0 Pr Σ Φ = > µ h y z  and   18
(B8)  ( )
* *,h y g  is the bivariate normal pdf characterized by( ) 11 1,Σ µ .  
Backwards sequential substitution of (B1)-(B6) yield the log likelihood function. 
 